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Question 2
Several writers (Justin, Clement, Irenaeus) argue that rewards and punishments only make sense if humans have genuine power to choose; what does this assumption reveal about God’s justice and character, and how does it challenge the idea that God commands what humans are unable to do?
Another way to ask: If rewards and punishment only make sense when people can really choose, what does that say about God being just? How does it push back on the idea that God commands things people can’t actually do?

Direct Answer The transcript presents God as just and morally coherent: He rewards and punishes because people truly can choose obedience or disobedience. That directly challenges the idea (attributed to Luther/Augustine/Calvin) that God commands what humans cannot do and then punishes them for inability.

Support from Transcript:

  • Justin: rewards and punishments are “rendered according to the merit of each man’s actions,” and if all happens by fate “neither is anything at all in our own power.”
  • Justin: without the power of “avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice,” humans “are not accountable.”
  • Clement: “Neither praises nor censures… rewards nor punishments are right if the soul does not have the power.”
  • Irenaeus: God’s counsel and commands imply ability—otherwise “what reason” would the Lord have “to give us counsel.”
  • Bercot attacks Luther’s claim (“commandments don’t imply ability”) as “convoluted logic,” like sending a son to fetch groceries that “aren’t in the car.”
Discussion Follow-ups The transcript presses a character question: what kind of Father gives impossible commands and then condemns? Where does your own view of justice line up?