Discussion Questions

David Bercot says the early Christians believed “we are writing the script” of our eternal destination while God has already “read” it by foreknowledge; how does his Super Bowl/VCR illustration help you understand that claim, and where does it still feel emotionally or logically unsatisfying? JumpstartAnother way to ask: How does Bercot’s Super Bowl/VCR example help you understand the idea that we choose our future while God already knows it? What still feels unfair or doesn’t make sense to you about it?

Several writers (Justin, Clement, Irenaeus) argue that rewards and punishments only make sense if humans have genuine power to choose; what does this assumption reveal about God’s justice and character, and how does it challenge the idea that God commands what humans are unable to do? JumpstartAnother way to ask: If rewards and punishment only make sense when people can really choose, what does that say about God being just? How does it push back on the idea that God commands things people can’t actually do?

Justin Martyr says God desired that “if they chose the things acceptable to him, he would keep them free from death,” and Theophilus says man “would himself be the cause of death to himself”; what picture of God’s intentions toward humanity emerges from those statements, and how does it confront the way many Christians talk about “God’s plan” for someone’s destruction? JumpstartAnother way to ask: From Justin and Theophilus, what do you think God wanted for humans—life or death? How does that challenge the way some Christians say it was “God’s plan” for someone to be destroyed?

Bercot notes that the early Christians repeatedly used the term “free will” and even claims they “coined it”; what do you think it means that Christians across Rome, Syria, Egypt, and Gaul were unified on this point, and what does that suggest about what ordinary churches assumed long before Augustine, Luther, and Calvin? JumpstartAnother way to ask: What does it mean that churches in many places agreed about “free will” very early on? What does that suggest regular Christians believed before Augustine, Luther, and Calvin?

Clement says, “Choice depended on the man… but the gift depended on God… For God does not compel,” and Bercot adds they “certainly didn’t believe in irresistible grace”; how would embracing that view reshape how you pray, evangelize, and think about God’s work in someone’s repentance without making salvation sound like self-salvation? JumpstartAnother way to ask: If God doesn’t force people and grace can be resisted, how would that change how you pray and share the gospel? How can you hold that view without making salvation sound like we save ourselves?

Bercot argues that God “deals with us… based on where we are right now” and doesn’t normally use foreknowledge to refuse someone admission to the vine; how does Tertullian’s Saul/Solomon example challenge common modern assumptions about assurance, backsliding, and God “already knowing you’ll fall away anyway”? JumpstartAnother way to ask: If God deals with us based on who we are right now, how do the Saul/Solomon examples challenge common ideas about being “once saved always saved” or backsliding? How does it challenge the thought that God won’t accept you because he already knows you’ll fall later?

Bercot calls Luther’s claim (“commandments don’t imply ability”) “convoluted logic” and compares it to telling a son to get groceries that aren’t in the car; what does this critique imply about God’s fatherhood, and where do you feel internal resistance to letting “commands imply ability” because of your theology of sin and weakness? JumpstartAnother way to ask: If God’s commands mean we are able to obey, what does that say about God as a Father? Where do you struggle with that idea because of how you think about sin and weakness?

He describes Calvinistic predestination as making God “cruel” or “sadistic” (the quadriplegic leaf-raking illustration) and says the doctrine wins acceptance because it relieves responsibility and produces “easy believism”; in what ways have you seen versions of that relief-of-responsibility logic in yourself or in your church culture? JumpstartAnother way to ask: How does the “leaf-raking” example make Calvinistic predestination seem cruel to Bercot? Where have you seen the idea of “I’m not really responsible” show up in you or your church?

Bercot insists that the evangelical compromise (“arbitrary predestination” plus real free will) isn’t a paradox but a contradiction, and then offers his own “genuine paradox” (foreknowledge-based predestination plus free will); what specific beliefs would you have to unlearn—especially around the word “elect”—to even be able to think in his categories? JumpstartAnother way to ask: If Bercot says “arbitrary predestination + real free will” is a contradiction, what beliefs would you need to drop to understand his view? What would you have to rethink about the word “elect”?

When addressing “God hardened Pharaoh’s heart,” Bercot presents Irenaeus’s foreknowledge explanation and Origen’s clay/wax-in-the-sun analogy (same action, different response based on the subject); how do these approaches change what you think God is doing when people harden under truth, miracles, or hard preaching, and how should that affect how you interpret rejection and resistance in real ministry situations? JumpstartAnother way to ask: How do the foreknowledge view and the clay/wax-in-the-sun picture change how you see God when people harden their hearts after truth or miracles? How should that affect how you respond to rejection in real ministry?